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Abstract: This article profiles four prominent detractors of Islam’s 
politicisation in contemporary Malaysia. While much ink has been spilt profiling 
the promulgators of politicised Islam, whether in Malaysia or elsewhere, 
comparatively little has been written about those who oppose it. This article 
is a modest attempt to rectify that deficiency. It begins, however, with a brief 
history of that politicisation process as it has occurred in Malaysia, with particular 
reference to Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM). This brief overview traces Malaysia’s unique form of politicised Islam 
to late twentieth-century intercommunal tensions driven by Malay poverty and 
cultural anxiety. These enabled long-standing ethno-religious associations to 
facilitate a blending of Islamist ideology with issues surrounding Malay rights. 
It is within this context that we then examine the social and educational 
backgrounds, principal publications, records of activism, and ideological 
positions of four prominent critics of Malaysian Islam’s politicisation, namely: 
Chandra Muzaffar, Zainah Anwar, Marina Mahathir, and Siti Kasim. The article 
concludes that all four figures differ from their counterparts in PAS and ABIM 
by possessing Western-orientated backgrounds, a long-standing dedication to 
multiculturalism, and a desire to orientate their work around human rights-
based issues. The article concludes by suggesting how (or if) these detractors 
can impact the future direction of Malaysian politics.  
Keywords: Islam, Malaysian politics, PAS, ABIM, Chandra Muzaffar, Zainah 
Anwar, Marina Mahathir, Siti Kasim
  
Introduction
This article presents short contextualised biographies of four prominent 
opponents of Islam’s politicisation in contemporary Malaysia. While much ink 
has been spilt profiling the promulgators of politicised Islam, whether in Malaysia 
or elsewhere, comparatively little has been written about those who oppose it. 
This article is a modest attempt to rectify that deficiency. It begins, however, 
with an overview of how Islam became established within modern Malaysia’s 
political landscape; concentrating on the country’s political heartland, the 
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Malay Peninsula, the article traces how late twentieth-century intercommunal 
tensions driven by Malay economic and cultural disenfranchisement enabled 
long-standing ethno-religious associations to facilitate a blending of Islamist 
ideology with issues surrounding Malay rights. Focusing on Malaysia’s 
most prominent Islamist organisations, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS, ‘Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party’) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, ‘Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia’), who together helped create and normalise 
contemporary Malaysia’s tradition of politicised Islam, the article describes how 
both organisations rooted their political agendas in a postcolonial concern for 
preserving indigenous racial and religious identity. Against this backdrop, the 
article profiles our four opponents: Chandra Muzaffar, Zainah Anwar, Marina 
Mahathir, and Siti Kasim. Characterised by a willingness to speak truth to 
power, these figures stand apart from their peers as significant social influencers 
capable of attracting largescale media attention. Here we briefly summarise their 
social and educational backgrounds, principal publications, records of activism, 
and ideological positions, consistently contrasting these biographical pointers 
with the specific features of Islam’s politicisation in Malaysia. Ultimately, we 
conclude that all four opponents differ from the promulgators of politicised 
Islam with regards to their Western-orientated backgrounds, dedication to 
multiculturalism, and frequent appeals to human rights-based discourses. We 
conclude by suggesting how (or if) our subjects can impact the future direction 
of Malaysian politics.
Islam and the Political Landscape in Malaysia 
Islam was first absorbed into the political landscape of what is now Malaysia 
around six centuries ago. In c.1412, the (either first or second) Hindu-Buddhist 
ruler of Melaka embraced Islam, changed his name to (Megat) Iskandar Shah, 
and began using culturally Islamic terminology to justify his (previously divine) 
right to rule. Taking popular pre-Islamic Persian conceptions of the ruler as a 
“Shadow of God” on earth (prevalent among Muslims since the Abbasid period) 
and fusing them with Sufism’s Perfect Man (al-insan al-kamil, representing 
Muhammad), Iskandar and his successors were able to craft a mystically 
derived, semi-divine status for themselves, even appropriating an Arabic term 
to describe it: daulat.1  
While this early (rather syncretic) manifestation of Islam in the political 
sphere has persisted, to a greater or lesser degree, into the present, more modern 
conceptions of what M. Laffan terms an “organic link” between Islamic religious 
praxis and state identity did not emerge in what is now Malaysia until the late 
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nineteenth century. Over that period, a group of reformist intellectuals called 
kaum muda (young generation), based in the Straits Settlements but with roots 
in the Minangkabau highlands of Sumatra,2 began appropriating the Cairene 
reformist discourse of Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1936). 
Arguing that a failure to maintain the true principles of Islam had allowed 
European civilisation to surpass the Islamic world, culminating in the latter’s 
colonisation, the kaum muda favoured rigorous social modernisation in tune 
with modern scientific and philosophical principles. They also sought to revive 
Muslim consciousness by restoring indigenous sovereignty, envisioning an 
Islamic state headed by socially active ‘ulama’. Although infused with Islamic 
values, this state would be based on modern constitutional parliamentary 
democracy.3 
As the twentieth century unfolded, this reformist ideology laid the groundwork 
for a series of Islamically orientated social and political movements right across 
the Malay Peninsula.4 After independence in 1957, these movements steadily 
gained in popularity; by the 1970s, two in particular, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia 
(PAS) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), had garnered sufficient 
support to begin reshaping, both directly and indirectly, Malaysia’s internal 
political trajectory, notably by inducing a period of intense government-led 
Islamisation. As we shall see, each of our four opponents to Islam’s politicisation 
in Malaysia emerged from the liberal secular backlash to this Islamisation 
project. For the sake of accurately mapping their intellectual trajectory, therefore, 
it behoves us to briefly describe the background of that project, including the role 
PAS and ABIM played therein.
Unlike Islamist organisations elsewhere in the Muslim world, PAS and 
ABIM did not evolve out of an overwhelmingly Muslim settling, but within an 
intrinsically multireligious environment: although predominantly Muslim (61.3 
per cent), Malaysia is also home to substantial Buddhist (19.8 per cent), Christian 
(9.2 per cent), and Hindu (6.3 per cent) populations.5 This religious plurality both 
reflects and interlinks with a similar degree of ethnic diversity: 68.8 per cent 
Bumiputera (including Malays), 23.2 per cent Chinese, and 7 per cent Indian. 
In the political sphere, this diversity has traditionally translated into a collection 
of political organisations defined by both ethnicity and religion, where Malay 
identity is linked to Islam, Chinese identity to Buddhism, and so on.6  Within this 
context, both PAS and ABIM have tended to meld (even subordinate) explicitly 
Islamist agendas to issues surrounding the Malays. PAS, for example, although 
unequivocally Islamist since its inception in 1951, has habitually situated that 
commitment within a broader postcolonial narrative framing Malay identity as a 
means of resisting imperialism. Thus, defining Islamic ‘authenticity’ in terms of 
state-level adherence to shariah (that is, the creation of an Islamic State headed 
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by ‘ulama’), PAS has traditionally fused a frequently plasticine notion of how 
that adherence can be achieved with a desire to establish Malay cultural and 
political centrality within Malaysia in direct opposition to foreign (including 
Chinese) hegemonies.8  
Similarly, although often ideologically linked to international and strictly 
Islamist organisations like Egypt’s Ikhwanul Muslimun (‘Muslim Brotherhood’) 
and South Asia’s Jamaat-e-Islami (‘Islamic Congress’),9  ABIM has also situated 
Islam within a much broader Malay rights discourse. Founded in August 1971 
by Malay Muslim university students affiliated with Persatuan Bahasa Melayu 
Universiti Malaya (PBMUM, ‘University of Malaya Malay Language Society’) 
and Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam Malaysia (PKPIM, ‘National 
Union of Malaysian Muslim Students’),10 ABIM’s long-term ideological stance 
was defined early on by its most prominent leader to date, Anwar Ibrahim (co-
founder and president, 1974-1982). Significantly, therefore, Anwar first entered 
political activism not as an idealistic young Muslim seeking to create an Islamic 
State, but as a vocal and charismatic champion of Malay rights. Speaking 
during an interview in 1987, Anwar described how he co-founded ABIM not to 
establish an Islamic State, but to organise young Malay voices in opposition to 
the government’s perceived neglect of Malay rights:
The leaders were condemning corruption, but they were enriching 
themselves. They talked about Malay nationalism but they were 
alienated from the Malay masses. They were obsessed with the west. 
They were too accommodating to non-Malay sentiments…We were 
impatient and angry about the plight of the Malays, their education, 
rural development, rural health…11 
Disgusted by “the utter failure of the Malay leadership to address issues 
of poverty [and] landlessness” among the Malays,12 Anwar moulded ABIM 
into a movement dedicated to highlighting these issues; in 1974 he was even 
detained by the government for 2 years after leading protests in support of poor 
Malay farmers from Baling, Kedah, who were being forced from their land by 
state authorities with only minimal compensation.13  But crucially, Anwar was 
also able to draw upon the aforementioned Malay-Islam linkage to successfully 
transform racial issues like these into Islamic ones. For both Anwar and ABIM, 
the promotion of Islam and Islamic issues was not therefore an end in itself, but 
a means of asserting Malay rights; the more central Islam was within society, the 
more important were the Malays. Unlike PAS’s top-down approach (an Islamic 
State founded by ‘ulama’), however, ABIM sought to achieve this centrality by 
encouraging an individual-level return to Qur’an and Sunnah. This would raise 
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Muslim consciousness among primarily secular-educated urban Malays with the 
intention of suffusing modern Malaysian society with Islamic values, essentially 
Islamising (and Malay-ising) it from the ground up. 
In 1982, after 8 years as ABIM president, Anwar Ibrahim surprised his allies 
by joining the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), a constituent part 
of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN, ‘National Front’) coalition, then under the 
control of Mahathir Mohamed (Malaysia’s fourth and seventh prime minister). 
With Malaysia’s middle class quickly becoming engulfed in a global tide of 
Islamic resurgence, Mahathir sought to co-opt ABIM’s Islamisation agenda in 
order to undercut support for PAS among Malay voters. He therefore allowed 
Anwar (Deputy PM by 1993) to bring his bottom-up, racialised Islamic agenda 
to government, where it informed an Islamisation project that saw Islam-based 
social and educational institutions emerge across the country and government 
programmes become infused with Islamic values.15 In consequence, although 
ABIM has always been apolitical, via Anwar Ibrahim it proved pivotal in reshaping 
government policy towards Islam, overturning a decades long British-inspired 
relegation of religion to the private sphere. Indeed, Anwar’s Islamisation agenda 
imprinted itself so firmly onto the previously secular UMNO that commentators 
began describing the latter as an Islamist organisation.16 In short, Mahathir’s 
co-option of Anwar Ibrahim helped mainstream and, ultimately, normalise the 
politicisation of Islam in Malaysia. 
Certainly, by the late 1990s, BN was projecting Islam as the cornerstone of 
Malaysian identity.17 Even Anwar’s 1998 expulsion from UMNO (following 
a spat with Mahathir) was insufficient to destabilise that perspective, which 
continued into the premierships of Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib 
Razak (2009-2018), even surviving BN’s 2018 election defeat to Pakatan 
Harapan (PH, ‘Coalition of Hope’) and the subsequent rise of the Perikatan 
Nasional (PN, ‘National Alliance’) government under Muhyiddin Yasin (2020-
).18 Moreover, its influence also came to bear on PAS, which suddenly found itself 
losing control of the Islamist narrative. Over the 1980s, in order to re-assert its 
authority, in this area PAS began shifting in an ever more conservative direction 
with the hope of garnering further support among rural Malays.19 Simultaneously 
falling under the control of a new generation of ‘ulama’ initially led by Yusof 
Rawa (PAS president 1983-1989), PAS began placing greater emphasis on 
outward conformity to Islamic (especially legal) norms, including the creation 
of an Islamic State, now modelled on the Iranian concept of the guardianship of 
the jurist.20 The party also became increasingly combative, notably by turning to 
takfirism, or the denouncing of Muslim opponents as unbelievers.21 Combined 
with an increased tendency to ignore the concerns of ethnic minorities and refuse 
cooperation with non-Muslim opposition groups, PAS arguably morphed into a 
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considerable source of inter- and intra-communal tension over this period. This 
has only worsened since the 2015 demise of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (PAS’s 
Spiritual Leader, 1991-2015, and First Minister of Kelantan, 1990-2013). A 
moderate figure, Nik Aziz had previously held in check the conservativism 
of PAS’s more extreme ‘ulama’ leaders, including current president Hadi 
Awang. After his death, however, Hadi Awang was able to purge PAS of Nik 
Aziz’s legacy, cementing control over party narrative—although this putsch 
also resulted in the formation of Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH, ‘Nation 
Trust Party’), a new moderate Islamist voice that continues Nik Aziz’s legacy 
while also taking inspiration from Tunisian politician, Rachid Ghannouchi.22 
Advocating an inclusive Islamic politics, AMANAH has so far proven popular 
among urban Malays, even entering the short-lived PH government. How it will 
shape Malaysian politics long-term, however, is uncertain.23  
To sum up, Islam has long enjoyed considerable political visibility across 
the Malay Peninsula. Its integration into modern Malaysian politics, however, 
resulting in its racialisation, began over the late nineteenth century, with the 
reform-minded kaum muda. Over the late twentieth century, via Anwar Ibrahim, 
ABIM’s unique version of that form of Islam was co-opted by Mahathir Mohamed, 
both to undermine PAS and re-assert Malay centrality within the nation. This 
co-option resulted in a government-led Islamisation drive that continues today; 
arguably it has served to promote Malay Muslim rights over those of other 
religious and ethnic groups, while also radicalising PAS ideology. As we shall 
see, these issues form the backdrop against which our four opponents to Islam’s 
politicisation have emerged. We now turn to a fuller discussion of these figures. 
Four Opponents of Islam’s Politicisation in Malaysia
Islam’s political resurgence across Malaysia during the 1970s and 1980s 
inevitably resulted in a proliferation of condemnatory voices. Frequently secular 
in tone and Western educated, these were directed against the perceived threat 
increased politicisation of religion posed to civil liberties and inter-communal 
relations. Today, despite the seemingly entrenched position politicised Islam 
enjoys in Malaysia, these voices remain prominent across the country’s political 
landscape. Here we profile four of the most significant (living) examples: Chandra 
Muzaffar, Zainah Anwar, Marina Mahathir, and Siti Kasim. Characterised by 
prolificacy, high public standing, and a willingness to speak truth to power, these 
figures stand apart from their peers as significant social influencers capable of 
attracting largescale media attention, thereby helping to direct the national 
debate. Here, as a reference point for other scholars, we summarise their social 
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and educational backgrounds, principal publications, records of activism, and 
ideological positions, before attempting to situate their work within a broader 
intellectual framework. We conclude by suggesting some thoughts on how (or 
if) they are likely to impact the future direction of Malaysian politics.
Chandra Muzaffar 
Chandra Muzaffar (b. 1947) is an academic and political activist well-known for 
his staunch independence of mind, prompting some to call him the “conscience” 
of modern-day Malaysia.  Born into a Hindu family from Bedong, Kedah (north 
Malaysia), he was educated locally, graduating from the National University 
of Singapore in the late 1960s.  First rising to prominence over the 1970s, 
Chandra has dedicated his life to promoting inter-civilisational dialogue, racial 
harmony, and inter-religious understanding within the context of Malaysia’s 
broad ethnic mix. In 1977, he founded Aliran Kesedaran Negara (Aliran, 
‘National Consciousness Stream’), a multi-ethnic reform movement dedicated 
to achieving social justice in Malaysia, which he headed until 1991. In 1987, 
after being detained for several months under the now defunct Internal Security 
Act (ISA) for criticising the first government of Mahathir Mohamed (1981-
2003), he founded the left-leaning NGO, International Movement for a Just 
World (JUST). Over the 1990s, Chandra developed JUST into an organisation 
with global reach, establishing branches in seventeen countries, including 
Australia, New Zealand, the USA, the UK, Sudan, and Iran.26 He continues to 
head this organisation today. Of our four activists, Chandra alone has attempted 
to enter politics; from 1999 to 2001 he served as Deputy President of Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, ‘People’s Justice Party’), established by Anwar Ibrahim 
after his expulsion from UMNO.27 Running in 1999’s General Election for the 
parliamentary seat of Bandar Tun Razak (Kuala Lumpur), Chandra lost to the 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) candidate representing BN.28  
A prolific writer, Chandra has published several important books, including: 
Universalism of Islam (1979),29 Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (1987),30 
Human Rights and the New World Order (1993),31  Alternative Politics for Asia: 
A Buddhist-Muslim Dialogue (1999),32 Muslims, Dialogue, Terror (2003),33 
Global Ethic or Global Hegemony? (2005),34 and Religion and Governance 
(2009).35  
Well known for directing his ire towards any section of society, regardless 
of origin or status, deemed by him to be promoting extreme and divisive views, 
Chandra has come into conflict with several politically-orientated Islamic groups. 
Beginning in the 1980s, he became extremely critical of BN’s Islamisation drive; 
mindful of his Indian Hindu heritage, he interpreted this drive as communally 
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divisive and designed to favour Malay Muslims over other ethnic and religious 
groups.36 But, despite this initial opposition to Islamisation, which resulted in 
his 1987 imprisonment, beginning in the 1990s, and in response to the post-
Cold War rise of America as the world’s only global hegemonic power, Chandra 
began producing a series of apologetics defending Islam against accusations 
of intolerance and political authoritarianism.37 Seeking to portray Islam as 
progressive, democratic, and multicultural, Chandra pivoted towards ABIM 
and Anwar Ibrahim’s call for a creative relationship between modernity and 
Islam that would allow the latter to blossom in the public sphere.38 In more 
recent years, therefore, Chandra has accepted a role for Islam in public life, but 
without losing his earlier bite: Chandra continues to criticise traditional Islamic 
revivalist movements as dogmatically rigid and unsuited to modernity, charging 
PAS in particular with promoting anachronistic visions of an Islamic state that 
will only cause communal division.39  
Zainah Anwar
Zainah Anwar (b. 1955) is a social activist and prominent Muslim feminist. 
The daughter of Tan Sri Haji Anwar bin Abdul Malik, an UMNO founding 
father, she was born and raised in Johor Bahru, the state capital of Johor, 
where she attended the prestigious (and British-founded) Sultan Ibrahim Girls’ 
School. In 1972, she entered the journalism programme at the Mara Institute 
of Technology (now Universiti Teknologi Mara, UiTM), based in Shah Alam, 
Selangor. Subsequently, she worked for the New Straits Times, a leading English-
language Malaysian newspaper owned by UMNO, before leaving Malaysia 
in 1978 to study journalism at Boston University (US) and then international 
law and diplomacy at Tufts University (US). Upon completing her studies in 
1986, she moved to London, where she worked for the Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies (1986-1991 and 1994-1999) and the Political Affairs 
division of the Commonwealth Secretariat.40 Zainah is most well-known, 
however, for co-founding Sisters in Islam (SIS) in 1988. Registered as an NGO 
in 1993, SIS advocates policy and legal changes designed to safeguard the status 
of women in society. In addition to her work with this organisation, Zainah 
has also been a commissioner with Suhakam (Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia) and is currently executive director of Musawah, an NGO founded by 
SIS in 2009 to promote equality and justice within the Muslim family.41 
Over the span of her career, Zainah has published numerous articles 
and speeches, including a monthly column in the widely-read Sunday Star 
newspaper, called ‘Sharing the Nation’. In total, she has written three books on 
political issues and women’s rights: Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah 
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Among the Students (1987),42  Islam and Family Planning (with Rashidah Shuib, 
2001),43  and Legacy of Honour (2011).44 She is also editor of Wanted: Equality 
and Justice in the Muslim Family (2009).45  
Taking a human rights-based approach to Islamic reform, Zainah has 
been inspired by Western feminism to challenge traditional attitudes towards 
polygamy, child custody, child marriage, hijab, domestic abuse, and other issues 
affecting women.46 In this context, under her leadership SIS actively promoted 
alternative, female-driven interpretations of the Qur’an; denying that (male) 
religious scholars have a monopoly over understanding Islamic scripture, SIS 
has sought to create a space in which women can decide for themselves how 
to interpret Islam, including shariah.47 In this regard, they have been heavily 
influenced by another of their co-founders, American Muslim convert Amina 
Wadud,48 while demonstrating (perhaps ironically) a similar concern for a return 
to original sources as seen among fundamentalists. 
Since the late 1990s, both Zainah and SIS have vocally criticised BN’s 
Islamisation project, which they causatively link to increased political 
authoritarianism, attacks on women’s rights, and the curbing of civil liberties, 
including freedom of religion and freedom of expression.49 With Zainah at their 
head, SIS have opposed all attempts to enforce hudud, a stance that brought them 
into conflict with PAS and other conservative Islamic groups. PAS, in response, 
has routinely disparaged Zainah and SIS’s religious credentials, accusing them of 
ignorance and promulgating alien Western values that undermine Malay Muslim 
culture. In 2014, PAS even persuaded Jabatan Mufti Selangor (‘Department 
of the Mufti of Selangor’) to issue a fatwa (legal opinion) condemning SIS as 
deviant and guilty of promoting “un-Islamic” values (liberalism and religious 
pluralism).50 This fatwa, which would effectively ban SIS in Selangor, was 
immediately challenged by the movement. Although SIS lost its initial appeal in 
2019, as of writing a second remains pending.51  
Marina Mahathir
Marina Mahathir (b. 1957) is one of Malaysia’s most prominent social activists 
and the eldest child of Mahathir Mohamed. Born and raised in Alor Setar, the 
state capital of Kedah, she initially attended the pre-dominantly Chinese St 
Nicholas convent school, followed by the prestigious Tunku Kurshiah College 
(TKC), a Malay boarding school in Negeri Sembilan. After a brief period at the 
Sultan Abdul Hamid College in Alor Setar, she completed her education at the 
University of Sussex (UK), graduating in 1979 with a degree in international 
relations.52 Since 1980, she has worked in journalism, contributing (from 
1989) a regular bi-weekly column called ‘Musings’ to Malaysia’s most widely 
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distributed English-language newspaper, The Star (majority owned by MCA, 
and therefore BN aligned).53 More recently, she has maintained an active online 
presence through her blog (http://rantingsbymm.blogspot.com) and published 
three books compiled from her newspaper columns and blogposts: In Liberal 
Doses (1997),54 50 Days: Rantings by MM (2009),55 and Telling It Straight 
(2012).56 From 1994 to 2005, Marina also headed Yayasan AIDS Malaysia 
(‘Malaysian AIDS Foundation’). More recently, she has replaced Zainah as 
the head of SIS. Internationally, she is on the Board of Trustees for the Asian 
University for Women (Bangladesh).57 
Throughout her career, Marina has sought to address the points of intersection 
between Islam, feminism, LGBTQ rights, and race. Although instigated by her 
father, Marina has consistently opposed Malaysia’s Islamisation programme as 
“Arab colonialism”.58  Characterising BN’s Islamisation drive as a surreptitious 
attempt to import rigid, Arab-orientated forms of Islam (i.e. Wahhabism) that 
undermine the traditional Malay Muslim values of tolerance and respect, she 
has accused BN of causing social division between not just different racial 
and religious groups, but also between different Muslim communities, where 
some are judged more “orthodox” than others.59  Within this milieu, she has 
repeatedly cited the treatment of women as a cause for concern; in 2006 she 
famously likened the status of Malay Muslim women to black South Africans 
under Apartheid, citing limited educational and employment opportunities.60  To 
help raise awareness of these issues, from 2000 to 2009 Marina co-produced a 
TV programme called 3R: Respect, Relax and Respond aimed at re-educating 
Muslim and non-Muslim viewers about the role of women in society. Although 
occasionally censored, this awarding-winning programme successfully addressed 
controversial societal issues like female empowerment, domestic violence, and 
gay rights. Uniquely among Malaysian TV programmes, it has been franchised 
for non-Muslim audiences in the Philippines and Vietnam.61 
Siti Kasim
Our final activist, Siti Kasim (b. 1963), is a lawyer and activist well-known for 
her flamboyant, unapologetic style and opposition to shariah. Born and raised 
in Kuala Lumpur, she travelled to London in 1987 to study law at Queen Mary 
University, eventually becoming a qualified litigation lawyer. Subsequently 
living and working in London, she returned to Malaysia in 2004, where she 
became a staunch defender of the country’s Orang Asli (indigenous) and LGBTQ 
communities. Currently, she is co-deputy chair of the Bar Council Committee 
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Overall, Siti is a fierce opponent of Anwar Ibrahim, whose Islamisation 
agenda (in common with Marina) she interprets as promoting Wahhabism, 
posited by her as an existential threat to Malaysia’s pluralistic society.63  Perhaps 
for this reason, she was consistently critical of the PH government (which 
Anwar was set to lead prior to another spat with Mahathir), being particularly 
vocal in her opposition to its Minister of Religion, AMANAH’s Mujahid Yusof 
Rawa. Dismissing his advocacy of a “compassionate Islam” based on maqasid 
al-shar’iah as “useless”, she criticised his perceived failure to support liberal 
groups like SIS as hypocritical and indicative of an anti-liberal agenda.64  She was 
equally scathing of PH’s failure to deport controversial Indian preacher, Zakir 
Naik, despite his inflammatory statements about non-Muslims and women.65 
Although Siti arguably lacks a detailed, systematic reformist agenda, to 
date her statements suggest an SIS-orientated vision. For example, in addition 
to staunchly opposing shariah as inherently discriminatory towards women, 
she advocates re-interpreting Islamic scripture in tune with liberal feminist 
ideology; like SIS, for example, she has urged the abolition of hijab based on 
a re-reading of surah al-Nisa.66 Siti’s real strengths, however, lie in her social 
activism, in questioning prevailing orthodoxies. In this regard, and within the 
context of a conservative local culture that prizes modesty, politeness, and 
respect, her flamboyant and confrontational style has been both her biggest asset 
and weakness. While guaranteeing her attention, it has often alienated even those 
sympathetic to her cause. To date, Siti’s most prominent forays into activism 
include her 2016 opposition to an attempt by PAS to extend the jurisdiction 
of Malaysia’s shariah courts, seen by many as a prelude to introducing hudud. 
During a forum on this issue, she was photographed shouting and “flipping the 
bird” at PAS supporters.67 Again in 2016, Siti was arrested by officers from 
Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (JAWI, ‘Department of Islamic 
Affairs in the Federal Territories’) while attending a closed-door transgender 
event in Kuala Lumpur. JAWI raided this regularly-held event on the grounds 
that those present were men acting as women, which contravenes shariah. They 
did not, however, have a correct warrant for the raid; when Siti confronted them 
about this, she was arrested for obstruction.68  Although subsequently acquitted in 
August 2020,69  images of Siti confronting officers at the event, where attendees 
allegedly “flashed” JAWI officers, shocked many. Most recently, in June 2020, 
Siti was questioned by both police and the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission (MCMC) regarding a Facebook post condemning PAS 
for suggesting a temporary ban on the sale and production of alcoholic beverages 
during an upsurge in drink-driving fatalities. The MCMC reportedly received 114 
complaints about the post, prompting its investigation. To date, no charges have 
been brought.70  
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Moving forward, Siti has launched Maju (Malaysian Action for Justice and 
Unity Foundation), an apolitical NGO aimed at organising Malaysia’s moderate, 
liberal, and progressive voices.71  Although yet to significantly influence national 
politics or policy formation, with Siti at its helm this pressure group has 
considerable future potential.
As outlined above, PAS and ABIM have both manifested a postcolonial 
concern with preserving indigenous identity. Within the context of Malaysia’s 
multicultural society, this has entailed appealing to long-standing ethno-
religious associations that have encouraged a blending of Islamist ideology with 
issues surrounding Malay rights. Unlike Islamist organisations elsewhere in the 
Muslim world, therefore, PAS and ABIM have found themselves addressing 
not merely a Muslim audience, but a specifically Malay Muslim audience. In 
consequence, they have consistently orientated their message around Malay 
cultural reference points (including use of the Malay language), at the exclusion 
of other (Muslim and non-Muslim) ethnic and cultural identity markers. Within 
this context, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the leadership of both PAS and ABIM 
have tended to share (particularly educational) backgrounds suffuse with 
traditional Malay cultural values. Both Nik Aziz and Hadi Awang, for example, 
hailed from traditional rural Malay communities, where they underwent equally 
traditional Malay-language programmes of religious education later completed 
in the Middle East at institutions highly respected among Malays (al-Azhar for 
Nik Aziz; the Islamic University of Medina and al-Azhar for Hadi Awang).72 
Although Anwar Ibrahim, despite being from rural Penang, attended the secular, 
Westernised, and English-language Malay College of Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) 
and then University Malaya (UM), his concern with maintaining Malay social 
and cultural primacy began early, when he rebelled against the lack of Malay 
cultural visibility at MCKK.73  Subsequently, while majoring in Malay Studies 
at UM, he also became president of PBMUM, where he devoted his energies to 
making Malay UM’s principal medium of instruction.74 
Significantly, the largely traditional backgrounds shared by these figures, 
characterised by rural upbringings, an emphasis on the Malay language, exposure 
(or a desire to be exposed) to Malay Muslim culture, and subsequent concern 
with Malay rights, are not replicated to the same degree among our four subjects. 
Rather, the latter are all products of multicultural urban environments: Chandra 
was originally a Hindu practitioner from Bedong, a small town just north of the 
multi-ethnic Sungai Petani (the largest town in Kedah); Zainah grew up in Johor 
Bahru, with its substantial Chinese population and close proximity to Singapore; 
Marina grew up in the Kedah state capital, Alor Setar, where she attended a 
Chinese school; and Siti Kasim is from Kuala Lumpur’s urban metropolis. 
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Moreover, each received a predominantly English-language education, in 
three cases taken to tertiary level in the West (UK and US), in the other case in 
Singapore. Two of our subjects, Zainah and Siti, also spent substantial periods 
working in the UK. Within this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that all four 
of our subjects write predominantly in English; although fluent Malay speakers, 
they have all chosen to express themselves primarily in a non-native, non-
Muslim, European language. This also extends to their organisations: JUST, SIS, 
and Maju all maintain English-language websites with only occasional content 
in Malay. This has significant implications with regards to intended audience: 
given the vast majority of rural Malays remain uncomfortable in English, our 
four subjects do not seem concerned with reaching out to the same target group 
as PAS, but rather to urban Malays who are generally highly educated and far 
more likely to speak English. Certainly, SIS’s membership, although small, is 
almost entirely concentrated in the Klang Valley,75  in which area all four of our 
subjects and their organisations operate. 
This urban focus immediately invites comparison with ABIM, however, 
which has similarly tried to attract highly-educated urban Malays, albeit using 
the Malay language. Indeed, although subsequently parting ways, Chandra 
was once closely allied to Anwar Ibrahim and PKR, both of which are ABIM 
aligned, although Zainah, Marina, and (in particular) Siti have all expressed 
opposition to these organisations. Nevertheless, that all four of our subjects have 
also sought to democratise the interpretation of Islam by advocating a return 
to Qur’an and Sunnah, thereby rejecting (or at least downplaying) traditional 
scholarship, likewise parallels ABIM. But, while ABIM’s (re)interpretative 
strategy has been driven by a Salafi-orientated return to traditional values (piety, 
modesty, chastity, etc.), all posited as inherently Qur’anic, the four individuals 
examined here prioritise an interpretative frame based on highly politicised 
Western discourses. Within the context of women’s rights, for example, Zainah, 
Marina, and Siti have all sought to reinterpret the Qur’an in line with Western 
notions of female emancipation; stressing individual empowerment and freedom 
of expression, they advocate relaxing traditional gender and sexual norms, 
notably by abolishing hijab, encouraging family planning, and increasing levels 
of female employment.76 ABIM (and PAS), on the other hand, have tended 
to stress the importance of women within the family, emphasising (albeit re-
conceptualised) traditional values like parenting, modesty, and chastity—
although, it bears saying, without demanding gender segregation, seclusion, or 
an end to either educational or employment opportunities for women.77   
As discussed, a desire to preserve and promote Malay rights ultimately 
underpins Islam’s politicisation in Malaysia. In consequence, that politicisation 
process is arguably both communally driven and parochial, being centred 
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on a particular community (the Malays) within a particular national context 
(Malaysia). Significantly, therefore, our subjects have each taken an explicitly 
oppositional stance to parochial worldviews, basing themselves instead on 
(supposedly) universal human rights designed to protect minority groups, 
not politically dominant majorities like the Malays.78  Chandra’s sustained 
opposition to Islamisation amply demonstrates this; he has consistently 
drawn upon human rights-based discourses to express concern for the 
social inequalities caused by government-led discrimination favouring the 
Malay Muslim majority.79  Similarly, Marina has highlighted the negative 
repercussions increased Malay cultural visibility has for the rights of minority 
groups. She has also emphasised how BN’s Islamisation project effectively 
creates a government sanctioned form of Islam that opposition groups then 
feel compelled to discredit. As briefly discussed, this has helped radicalise 
Malaysia’s Islamic narrative, encouraging divisive phenomena like takfirism, 
which is often directed at Muslim minorities. Ultimately, this minority rights 
focus, also apparent in Siti’s championing of Orang Asli and LGBTQ rights, is 
likely a function of the multicultural backgrounds shared by our four subjects. 
Hailing from diverse urban environments, they have all spoken about recreating 
the (perceived) ethnic and religious harmony of their youth by promoting racial 
and religious equality now.80 Given a focus on minorities also characterises 
Western political discourse, this stance may be a consequence of our subjects’ 
educational and ideological backgrounds, too.
Moving forward, whether our four subjects can influence Malaysia’s political 
landscape over the long-term is uncertain. Although able to boast considerable 
public visibility, with both Zainah and Marina possessing close familial ties to 
those in power, their reliance on Western ideological perspectives expressed 
in English is problematic. As a democracy in which changes of government 
do occur, Malaysia’s political consciousness is shaped by popular appeal as 
much as by association with powerful elites. The longevity and resilience of 
Malaysia’s Islamisation project, with its celebration of Malay culture (including 
language), demonstrates this: stretching across governments and between parties, 
its popularity among everyday Malay voters has made it a perennial feature of 
the country’s political landscape.81  In consequence, it is unlikely that the four 
individuals examined here will be able to significantly influence popular Malay 
opinion without shifting towards a more Malay Muslim vision. Although their 
vocal support for issues like freedom of expression, community cohesion, and 
women’s rights will no doubt continue to constitute a valuable check on those in 
power, particularly within urban contexts, our subjects must seek greater Malay 
cultural embeddedness or else risk irrelevance. 
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Conclusion
To conclude, since at least the early fifteenth century, Islam has enjoyed varying 
degrees of political visibility across what is now Malaysia. Beginning in the 
late nineteenth century, this visibility underwent rapid popular expansion, 
initially at the hands of reform-minded kaum muda intellectuals, and then in 
tandem with Islamist organisations like PAS and ABIM. Within Malaysia’s late 
twentieth-century multicultural environment, where a continuation of colonial-
era economic disparities favouring the Chinese had precipitated sustained 
Malay Muslim poverty, Islam finally fused with a concern for preserving 
Malay rights. Appealing to long-standing ethno-religious associations linking 
a sense of ‘Muslimness’ with being Malay, idealogues from both PAS and 
ABIM encouraged a blending of Islamist ideology with broader political issues 
surrounding Malays. Unlike Islamist organisations elsewhere in the Muslim 
world, therefore, those in Malaysia found themselves addressing not merely a 
Muslim audience, but a specifically Malay Muslim audience. 
Over the early 1980s, Mahathir Mohamed successfully co-opted this 
racialised Islamist agenda by bringing Anwar Ibrahim (former ABIM president) 
into government. This precipitated a nationwide, government-sanctioned 
Islamisation drive that continues today; stretching across governments and 
between parties, this drive has promoted Malay Muslim rights over those of 
other religious and ethnic groups, while simultaneously radicalising broader 
Islamist discourse. It is against this backdrop that our four opponents to Islam’s 
politicisation emerged. Frequently secular in tone and Western educated, 
these opponents have directed their ire against the perceived threat increased 
politicisation of religion poses to civil liberties and inter-communal relations. 
While the promulgators of politicised Islam generally share traditional 
backgrounds characterised by rural upbringings, an emphasis on the Malay 
language, and an exposure to Malay Muslim culture, our four subjects are more 
cosmopolitan. Products of multicultural urban environments, they were educated 
abroad in English-language settings, continue to use English in preference to 
Malay, and demonstrate a preoccupation with upholding not Malay Muslim 
culture but (supposedly) universal human rights rooted in Western discourse. 
While PAS, ABIM, and other relevant actors have therefore taken pains to 
portray themselves as champions of Malay culture, consistently appealing to 
Malay identity markers and using the Malay language, their opponents take up 
a position centred on Western concepts expressed in English. 
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Despite the seemingly entrenched position politicised Islam now enjoys in 
Malaysia, our four subjects remain prominent within the country’s political 
landscape. Their prolificacy, high public standing, and willingness to speak 
truth to power have ensured they remain significant social influencers. The 
longevity and resilience of Malaysia’s Islamisation project, however, based in 
its appeal to Malay Muslim values, suggests our opponents will not be able to 
significantly influence popular Malay opinion without shifting towards a more 
Malay Muslim vision. They must seek greater Malay cultural embeddedness or 
else risk irrelevance. 
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